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ARGUMENT 
1. Defendants cannot dispute the clear ruling of the trial court that Defendant 
Dan R. Evans is a beneficiary of the Revans Trust by citation to the doctrine 
of merger or by incorrect statements of fact. In addition. Defendants did not 
properly raise the ruling by cross appeal. 
The doctrine of merger provides that when all legal and equitable interests in 
property transferred in trust are held by the same person, then merger of the legal and 
equitable interests has occurred resulting in the extinguishment of the previously 
existing trust. Plaintiff was not able to locate relevant Utah authority applying the 
doctrine of merger to an intervivos trust and thus causing an extinguishment of the 
intervivos trust, however, substantial, long standing case law exists which sets forth the 
doctrine of merger in this context. The Supreme Court of North Carolina opined: 
"[W]here the holder of the legal title and the cestui que trust are 
one and the same person, the result is a merger of the legal and 
equitable title, defeating the trust and ordinarily conferring a fee 
simple title upon the person holding the legal title and beneficial 
interest. It is essential, however, that the equitable interest of no 
other person shall intervene. It is also stated as a condition of 
merger that the legal and equitable estates must be coextensive 
and commensurate; Lewin on Trusts (1939 Ed.), p. 12; or, as 
otherwise stated, the legal estate must be at least as extensive as 
the equitable. Odom v. Morgan, 111 N.C. 367, 369, 99 S.E. 
195." 
Blades v. R. #., 224 N.C. 32, 37 (1944); See also, Contella v. Contella, 559 So.2d 
1217, 1218 (Fla.App. 5 Dist. 1990) (no separation of legal and equitable interest 
invokes merger doctrine and trust is terminated); Langley v. Conlan, 212 Mass. 135, 
138 (1912) (when legal and equitable title to real estate vest in same person, absolute 
ownership will ensue divested of the trust). 
Recently, In the Matter of Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589 (2003) the 
Supreme Court of Utah referred to the doctrine of merger, but did not outline the 
doctrine or find an occurrence of merger to extinguish an intervivos trust. The 
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Supreme Court stated that certain provisions were placed in an intervivos trust 
agreement to prevent the operation of merger. Id. at 596. 
The Defendants err in their advancement of the doctrine of merger to support the 
trial court's denial of Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment requesting imposition of 
a constructive trust. {Brief of the Appellees, p. 15). There was no merger in one 
person, Renee Evans, of all legal interests and equitable interests in the 
res/principal/property of the Revans Trust, more specifically identified as the 
Farmington Property. 
The Defendants first err by failing to refute the clear and concise ruling of the 
trial court that Daniel R. Evans ("Dan Evans") was a beneficiary of the Revans Trust. 
(R. 1720 and 1726). Plaintiff argued this position in pleadings filed with the trial court 
and accepted in the trial court's ruling cited above. (R. 1417 to 1423) 
Plaintiff continues to rely upon and directs the Court to the Brief of the Appellant, 
where in connection with the trial court's ruling Plaintiff clearly demonstrates that case 
law and Section 156 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959), permits the creditors 
of Dan Evans (including Plaintiff and/or the Nevada bankruptcy estate of In re: 
Daniel R. Evans) to reach the property of the Revans Trust (i.e. the Farmington 
Property) to satisfy the judgments/claims of such creditors. {Brief of the Appellant, 
p.21 to 32) The ruling of the trial court that Dan Evans is a beneficiary of the Revans 
Trust creates a substantial right for the Plaintiff for satisfaction of its claims. 
The Defendant does not present any basis of support for the argument that Renee 
was the sole beneficiary and sole trustee of the Revans Trust other than an allegation of 
intent by Dan Evans to transfer his interest in the Farmington Property. In determining 
the intent of Dan Evans as Settlor of the Revans Trust his intention must be ascertained 
from the language of the Dare Trust and Revans Trust documents. See, Makoffv. 
Makojf, 528 P.2d 797, 798 (1974). The trial court in its Amended Memorandum 
Decision reviewed the Dare Trust document in detail, which was the only written trust 
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document executed in 1989, and found that Dan Evans' intent was that he was to be a 
beneficiary of the Revans Trust. (R. 1719 and 1720). In reviewing the ruling of the 
trial court, Defendants in the Brief of the Appellees cited this Court to the ruling of the 
trial court that Dan Evans was a beneficiary of the Dare Trust, Revans Trust and 
Day mond Trust. (Brief of the Appellees, p. 7). 
Dan Evans is a beneficiary of the Revans Trust, therefore he holds an equitable 
interest in the ras/principal/property of the Revans Trust, more specifically identified as 
the Farmington Property, and there can be no merger of all interests in Renee Evans. 
The Defendants err further in attempting to convince this Court that Renee Evans 
solely held the legal interests of the ras/principal/property of the Revans Trust by 
stating eight (8) times in the Brief of the Appellees that Renee Evans holds sole legal 
title to the res/principal/property of the Revans Trust. (Brief of the Appellees, p. 13 t 
38, 15, 17, 19, 20 and 22). However, the Defendants clearly contradict themselves by 
stating five (5) times that from 1989 through June 20, 1997, Dan Evans and Renee 
Evans were both trustees of the Revans Trust. (Brief of the Appellees, p. 14 f^ 43, 14 to 
15 t 45, 17, 24 and 25). Plaintiff presented clear evidence that Dan Evans was a 
trustee of the Revans Trust. (R. 41, 42, 101, 102, 894, 1340, 1341 and 1342) 
(Addendum 4 and Addendum 5 to Brief of the Appellant). The trial court specifically 
found that Dan Evans was a trustee of the Revans Trust. (R. 1715). The fact, 
admitted to by Defendants, that Dan Evans was a trustee of the Revans Trust prevents 
the imposition of the doctrine of merger. 
As argued by Plaintiff in the Brief of the Appellant, under the doctrine of Langnes 
v. Green. 282 U.S. 531, 538-39, 51 S.Ct. 243, 246, 75 L.Ed. 520 (1931) as adopted 
by the Supreme Court of Utah in State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 356 (Utah 1996), the 
Defendants may not attempt to argue for the overturning of the trial court's ruling that 
Dan Evans was a beneficiary of the Revans Trust. (Brief of the Appellant, p. 29 to 31). 
While stating that a party is only required to file an appeal based on the outcome of the 
lower court's decision, the Supreme Court also identified the balance to be maintained 
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by stating "[n]or should a party be allowed to employ its adversary's appeal or petition 
as a vehicle to gain a greater benefit than that granted below." South at 356. For this 
Court to rule that Defendants need not have filed an appeal on the issue of whether Dan 
Evans was a beneficiary and to find that Dan Evans was not a beneficiary would work 
to create a greater benefit for Dan Evans than granted below by restricting Dan Evans' 
creditors' (including Plaintiff) satisfaction of claims through execution on the 
Farmington Property and/or potential exclusion of the Farmington Property from the 
Nevada bankruptcy estate of In re: Daniel /?. Evans. (Brief of the Appellant, p. 19, 20 
and 21). 
2. Plaintiffs reply to Defendants' other points as set forth in the Brief of the 
Appellees is not required as Plaintiffs arguments are set forth in the Brief of 
the Appellant, 
a. Plaintiffs argument concerning the concealment of the 1997 transfer of 
Farmington Property. 
The Plaintiffs argument concerning the issue the concealment of the transfer of 
the Farmington Property is set forth in the Brief of the Appellant at page 43. 
b. Plaintiffs argument concerning the existence of a transfer of Dan Evans 
legal interest as trustee in 1997. 
The Plaintiffs argument concerning the execution of a deed in 1997 and Dan 
Evans removal of himself as trustee of the Revans Trust as triggering a transfer is set 
forth in the Brief of the Appellant at pages 41 and 42. 
CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of merger is inapplicable to the case at bar based on: 1) the clear 
ruling of the trial court and as argued by Plaintiff below that Defendant Dan Evans is a 
beneficiary of the Revans Trust, and 2) incorrect statements concerning the trustees of 
the Revans Trust. By failing to file a cross appeal, Defendants are barred from raising 
issues relating to Dan Evans' status as a beneficiary. To find otherwise would be a 
modification of the trial court's ruling and result in using Plaintiffs appeal as a vehicle 
to gain a greater benefits for the Defendants while lessening the rights of Plaintiff 
granted by the trial court. 
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As shown by Plaintiff in the Brief of the Appellant, the trial court's determination 
not to impose a constructive trust on the current trustee of the Revans Trust was in 
error. A determination in favor of the Plaintiff allows the creditors (including Plaintiff) 
of Dan Evans to reach the res/principal/property of the Revans Trust, more specifically 
identified as the Farmington Property, to satisfy their claims by execution on such 
property or by administration of the equitable interest of Dan Evans in the 
ras/principal/property of the Revans Trust by the trustee of the Nevada bankruptcy 
estate of In re: Daniel R. Evans was in error. The use of the equitable remedy of a 
constructive trust will accomplish satisfaction of such claims or administration of such 
estate in the most efficient manner. 
As shown by Plaintiff in the Brief of the Appellant, the trial court's determination 
that Dan Evans did not retain the power to revoke the Revans Trust and regain fee 
simple interest in the Farmington Property should be reversed by this Court based on 
the language of the Dare Trust and Amended Dare Trust concerning the ability of a 
Grantor to reacquire the property which he contributed to the trust. 
As shown by Plaintiff in the Brief of the Appellant, undisputed facts, i.e. badges 
of fraud, exist concerning Dan Evans' fraudulent conveyance of the Farmington 
Property to Dan Evans and Renee Evans as trustees of the Revans Trust in 1989 or by 
Dan Evans' transfer of record title to Renee Evans as the sole trustee of the Revans 
Trust in 1997. Based on such badges of fraud, this Court should either: 1) grant 
Plaintiff's motion that the transfer of the Farmington Property by Dan Evans is 
voidable under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-1, et. 
seq. (1995), or 2) find in the alternative that genuine issues of material fact exist 
concerning the transfer of the Farmington Property by Dan Evans and therefore reverse 
the trial court's granting of Defendants' Motion - Dan Evans and refer this matter back 
to the trial court for further proceedings. 
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Respectfully submitted this 17th day of September, 2004. 
J. Jay Bui; 
Clinton J. Bullock 
Karen Bullock Kreeck 
BULLOCK LAW FIRM 
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Lakeside 
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